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Philippa Foot (2001) and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), along with other philoso-
phers, have argued for a metaethical position, the natural goodness approach,
that claims moral evaluations are, or are on a par with, teleological claims
made in the biological sciences. Specifically, an organism’s flourishing is char-
acterized by how well they function as specified by the species to which they
belong. In this essay, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness ap-
proach. Second, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is
inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are in-
correct. Third, I consider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as
a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompatible with
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our considered moral judgments. Fourth, after presenting gene-culture coevo-
lution theory, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and norma-
tivity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amending
the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. However,
this approach, though not biologically reductionistic, still generates claims in-
compatible with our considered moral judgments. Finally, I end with a discus-
sion of methodology and revisionistic moral theories.
1 Introduction
One of the most challenging topics in contemporary philosophy is normativity.
Specifically, the most difficult aspect of this topic is making sense of normativ-
ity in a wholly natural world. We can motivate the challenge of normativity by
considering the “argument from queerness” articulated by J. L. Mackie (1990).
Consider stereotypical natural properties like mass, negative charge, carapace,
polypeptide, species, and so forth. If there are normative ethical or epistemic
properties, then they would have to have an intrinsic “to-be-pursuedness” to
them. However, Mackie claims that there are no such properties described by
the natural or social sciences. If the only properties are natural properties (i.e.
those described by the natural and social sciences) and there are no norma-
tive natural properties, then it follows that there are no normative properties.
Of course, there are a variety of ways of responding to Mackie’s argument.
One could deny that there are moral properties; rather, moral or epistemic
judgments are expressions of commitments to various plans (Blackburn, 1984;
Gibbard, 1992). Additionally, one could argue in a Humean fashion that what
one should do is always a function of beliefs and desires. However, the lat-
ter can be made sense of in a natural world (Railton, 1986). Likewise, one
could argue that there are natural properties with this “to-be-pursuedness”;
specifically, these properties can be found in the biological sciences (Casebeer,
2003; Post, 2006). An understanding of such properties is thought to come
from evolution by natural selection. Consider your heart. It has the function
of circulating blood through your body. That is, this is what it is supposed to
do. It came to have this function because it was this effect for which it was
selected against other heritable variants. Insofar as your heart does not circu-
late blood it is malfunctioning. Thus, one strategy of reducing normativity to
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natural properties is through evolutionary biology.1
One bold approach to ethical normativity is offered by contemporary Neo-
Aristotelians. They are of the view that normative claims made of non-human
animals and plants are of the same form as that of ethical judgments we make
with regard to our own species. However, their views sit uneasily with bio-
logical teleology as we shall see. In this essay, I take this “natural goodness
approach” seriously. First, I provide a sketch of this approach highlighting how
uncomfortable Neo-Aristotelians have been with reducing ethical normativity
to evolutionary biology. Second, I consider a challenge that philosophers such
as David Hull (1986) and Philip Kitcher (1999) have offered regarding ap-
proaches that ground normative ethical claims in human nature. After some
discussion, I find their challenge wanting since it presupposes a particularly
strong form of essentialism that is optional. Third, I consider the prospects
of reducing ethical normativity to the work of evolution by natural selection.
Though Neo-Aristotelians reject this move, it is instructive in considering how
such an approach would violate our considered moral judgments. I give one
such example by considering Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer’s (Thornhill
and Palmer, 2001) speculative work on the evolution of rape. Finally, I ar-
gue that the only prospect of reconciling naturalism and normativity must
come from understanding teleology through a “gene-culture coevolutionary”
account of selected functions. However, I argue that it has very similar con-
flicts with our considered moral judgments. Insofar as altruistic punishment
has evolved by cultural group selection, it has the function of driving other less
altruistic groups socially extinct which is extremely problematic from a moral
point of view. Lastly, I urge that insofar as moral theories are revisionistic, thus
rejecting considered moral judgments, they must do so in a way that is not ad
hoc.
2 Natural Goodness
Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism, or what I will call the natural goodness approach,
is an important option in metaethics and has been ably defended by G. E. M.
Anscombe, P. T. Geach, Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum,
Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Michael Thompson. On this view, a character trait
1It is worth stressing that these different sources of normativity are not strictly speaking
incompatible with one another. It is only arguments like Mackie’s argument from queerness
that encourage us to make a choice.
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is a virtue if, and only if, it is a trait that a human needs in order to live well
or flourish. This notion of flourishing is not sui generis but as Hursthouse
suggests, “when we talk about ethically good human beings, we have not sud-
denly started to use the word ’good’ in a totally new ’moral’ or ’evaluative’
way” (Hursthouse, 1999, 226). As, Peter Geach writes,
Men need virtues as bees need stings. An individual bee may per-
ish by stinging, all the same bees need stings; an individual man
may perish by being brave or just, all the same men need courage
and justice. (Geach, 1977, 17)
The notion of flourishing is a naturalistic one understood in same manner as
functional claims offered in the biological sciences.
One way of motivating the approach is by considering the semantics of the
term ’good’. Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, have thought
that ’good’ is a predicative adjective. Consider the sentence, “This is a green
computer.” This claim implies “This is a computer” and “This is green.” Gram-
matically, the adjective ’green’ can come before the noun or after the copula.
However, attributive adjectives are not like this. For example, consider the
sentence, “Charlie is a small dog.” This claim does not imply “Charlie is a
dog” and “Charlie is small.” The reason for this is that the property smallness
depends on the type or kind of object of which we are making the predication.
On the natural goodness approach, the property goodness is always goodness
in a way. As Foot writes,
Such a colour word operates in independence of any noun to which
it is attached, but whether a particular F is a good F depends radi-
cally on what we substitute for ’F ’. As ’large’ must change to ’small’
when we find that what we thought was a mouse was a rat, so ’bad’
may change to ’good’ when we consider a certain book of philos-
ophy first as a book of philosophy and then as a soporific. Seen
in the light of Geach’s distinction, thoughts about good actions,
which are fundamental to moral philosophy, appear with thoughts
about good sight, good food, good soil, or good houses. (Foot,
2001, 2 - 3)2
2Foot seems to be overstating the point. The term ’green’ does not operate completely
independently of the noun to which it is attached. For example, if I say “7 is green” I have
made a category mistake since numbers are not colored.
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The notion that goodness is always relative to a kind is contrary to utilitari-
anism, for example. Suppose x is good and y is good. Thus, according to
utilitarianism, either x is better than y , y is better than x , or they are equal in
value. This is true independent of what x and y are. Neo-Aristotelians deny
goodness is like this.
The natural goodness approach is a cognitivist metaethical theory in that
moral claims are truth-apt; i.e. they are either true or false.3 However, un-
like J. L. Mackie’s cognitivist error theory, some positive moral claims are
true according to Neo-Aristotelians.4 Additionally, since the natural good-
ness approach is naturalistic, then moral properties are just natural properties.
Whether one regards this as a reductionistic theory really depends on how we
understand reductionism. If we consider psychological, biological, anthropo-
logical, sociological, etc. properties as natural, then moral properties just are
natural properties. They reduce to them. However, reductionism in other con-
texts like the philosophy of mind often considers reductionism as requiring
that mental states reduce to physics. The natural goodness approach is not
committed to this stronger form of reductionism.
Additionally, most proponents of the natural goodness approach are sup-
porters of virtue ethics as the correct normative theory. We can summarize
this approach following Rosalyn Hursthouse. According to virtue ethics,
P1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would charac-
teristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.
P1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain char-
acter traits, namely, the virtues.
P2. A virtue is a character trait that... (Hursthouse, 1999, 28, 29)
3For the purposes of this paper, I am ignoring deflationary approaches to truth (Armour-
Garb and Beall, 2005). There is a worry that deflationary approaches trivialize the differences
between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories (Dreier, 1996, 2004). Consider the Equiva-
lence Schema < p > is true if, and only if, p where < p > is a name forming operator on p.
Thus, the claim <Murder is wrong> is true if, and only if, murder is wrong. But this seems to
imply that moral claims are trivially true. For example, suppose a simple-minded emotivism
was correct and “Murder is wrong” is equivalent to “Boo murder!”; this would still seem to
suggest controversially such moral imperatives were truth-apt.
4On Mackie’s error theory, a positive moral claim like “Murder is morally wrong” is false
because the term ’morally wrong’ is non-referring since there is no such property moral wrong-
ness.
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Presumably, (P2) can be fleshed out by providing a list of the virtues and cri-
teria for what makes those traits virtues. For example, virtues are those traits
that benefit the possessor or contribute to eudaimonia (i.e. human flourish-
ing). The important point here is that one can subscribe to the natural good-
ness approach without subscribing to virtue ethics of the above sort. Con-
sider character consequentialism which holds we should choose or inculcate
those character traits which produce the greatest expected well-being (Driver,
2001). One could consistently claim that our well-being is given by the natural
goodness approach. The two theories would not be extensionally equivalent.5
Following Elizabeth Anscombe, a fundamental notion for the natural good-
ness approach is what is termed an “Aristotelian necessity.” An Aristotelian
necessity is something which is required for an F to be a good F . Foot writes,
We invoke the same idea when we say that it is necessary for plants
to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs,
and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill. These ’Aristotelian
necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and
animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making
out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine
what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should
be, and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous
differences between the life of humans and that of plants or ani-
mals, we can see that human defects and excellences are similarly
related to what human beings are and what they do. We do not
need to be able to dive like gannets, nor to see in the dark like
owls; but our memory and concentration must be such as to allow
us to learn language, and our sight such that we can recognize
faces at a glance; while, like lionesses, human parents are defec-
tive if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to
survive. (Foot, 2001, 15)
As examples, a Neo-Aristotelian would claim a rhododendron which does not
flower or an oak tree with shallow roots are defective since they do not have
those features conducive to their flourishing. This is also true for antisocial
5One way of seeing this is that virtue ethics is not a maximizing theory whereas charac-
ter consequentialism is. However, one could evaluate character traits with regard to their
expected consequences without thinking these traits could be maximized or even are com-
mensurable with regard to one another. Thanks to Richard Boyd on this point.
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bonobos and free-riding wolves (Sandler, 2005). If we say that a person is
a good human being, we are saying they must have those properties which
are required for them to be good qua human being. That is, if we say that
Sheila is a good Homo sapiens, then she must have those properties which are
necessary for her to be good qua Homo sapiens. The logical structure of moral
judgments then have the same form as when we ascribe functional properties
to organisms. If a sequoia is a good qua Sequoia sempervirens, then it has those
features required as a member of that species to be a good instance of it.
Clearly, the characteristics which make for a good human can be different
from that of other species. As human behavioral ecologists have noted, human
life history traits are relatively unique. We differ from other primates in that
our children depend on us for subsistence far longer than other mammal’s
offspring, we wean babies earlier than most other apes do so, and the age
of first reproduction is much older comparatively (though our fertility can
be greater than other apes). Additionally, we have the longest average age
of the terrestrial mammals though women stop giving birth in the middle of
their lives. It is worth noting that what features or traits are conducive to
the flourishing of a human being need not be universally applicable across
different individuals of a species or different life stages of the same individual.
It can be the case that what characteristics are conducive to flourishing varies
with regard to sex, age, stage, and habitat.
Hursthouse argues we should evaluate living things as members of their
kind. One is a good member of a kind when one contributes in ways charac-
teristic of that kind to the ends of survival and reproduction (and possibly to
the characteristic enjoyments of the kind and where rationality plays a role in
Homo sapiens). She writes,
A good social animal (of one of the more sophisticated species)
is one that is well fitted or endowed with respect to (i) its parts,
(ii) its operations, (iii) its actions, and (iv) its desires and emo-
tions; whether it is thus well fitted or endowed is determined by
whether these four aspects well serve (1) its individual survival,
(2) the continuance of its species, (3) its characteristic freedom
from pain and characteristic enjoyment, and – the good function-
ing of its social group – in the ways characteristic of the species.
(Hursthouse, 1999, 202)
A free-riding wolf, a non-sharing bee, or a nurturing polar bear are defective.
Ethical evaluations are made with regard to our characteristic properties in-
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cluding rationality. But there is nothing essential about rationality; it possible
other features like fire-making or cooking could be species typical for us.6
Defenders of the natural goodness approach have denied that moral eval-
uative claims can be reduced to biological ones. Rather they are “on a par”
with them. Put differently, they are of the same form as biological functional
claims.
It is imperative that the word ’function’ as used here is not con-
fused with its use in evolutionary biology, where, as Simon Black-
burn has put it in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ’the func-
tion of a feature of an organism is frequently defined as that role
it plays which has been responsible for its genetic success and evo-
lution’ (149-50).... It is easy to confuse these technical uses of
words such as ’function’ and ’good’ with their everyday uses, but
the meanings are distinct. To say that some feature of a living
thing is an adaptation is to place it in the history of a species. To
say that it has a function is to say that it has a certain place in the
life of the individuals that belong to that species at a certain time.
(Foot, 2001, 32)
We are not then interpreting it as a historical question, as ’proper
function’ is interpreted, for instance, by Ruth Millikan in Language,
Thought, and Other Biological Categories, chapter 1, and as ’func-
tion’ would generally be interpreted in evolutionary biology. As
David Wiggins says in Postscript 4 in Needs, Values, Truth, 353, ’we
really need to describe what morality has become, a question on
which evolutionary theory casts no particular light’. (Foot, 2001,
40)
Hurtsthouse reaches a similar conclusion in her discussion of Bernard Williams’
(Williams, 1983) criticisms of Neo-Aristotelianism.
One thing this passage draws to our attention is that the non-
ethical evaluations of living things that I have outlined are ’Aris-
totelian’ rather than Darwinian. They do, as I have been at pains
6It is worth noting that some use the term ’human’ to be synonymous with the concept
PERSON. However, I use the term ’human’ be synonymous with the concept HOMO SAPIEN.
Hence, one might claim that the property rationality is essential to personhood. Fair enough.
But, it does not follow that it is essential to being a member of our biological species.
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to emphasize, rely on the idea that there is, in relation to each
natural kind of thing, ’an appropriate (= characteristic) way for
things of that kind to behave’ in relation to which they are evalu-
ated as good or defective. The evaluations do not – as they might
in a post-Darwinian age – evaluate members of species of living
things simply as good, or not so good, or downright defective, as
replicators of their genes. (Hursthouse, 1999, 257)
As we shall see in §4, there are non-historical accounts of function. How-
ever, they cannot do the job that Foot and Hursthouse want. Additionally,
their view creates a tension for the natural goodness approach. That is, they
face the following dilemma. If moral evaluative claims are reducible to bio-
logical ones, then there will be problematic ethical implications of the natural
goodness approach. If moral evaluative claims are not reducible to biological
ones, then it is unclear how the natural goodness approach is naturalistic. The
only good theory we have of normative natural functions is the selected ef-
fects account (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991; Godfrey-Smith, 1994). In this
essay, I argue that this dilemma renders the natural goodness approach very
problematic.
3 Natural Goodness Meets Evolutionary Biology
One popular view of the sciences is that they investigate natural kinds.7 For
simplicity, we can start with the idea that a natural kind is a group of objects
such that there are essential properties which they share and which explains
the other properties they possess. As examples, the kind gold is characterized
by all of those things which have the atomic number 79 or the kind carnivore is
characterized by all those things which have the property of being an exclusive
flesh-eater. One can defend a global or local essentialism. Global essentialism
is the view that for any science, the objects it investigates include natural
kinds defined by essential properties. Local essentialism suggests that some
sciences investigate natural kinds but others may not.8 Additionally, we can
7Here I follow the discussion found in (Sober, 1980).
8To be clear, a science may investigate natural kinds and concrete particulars. For example,
astronomy investigates the kind black hole but also specific black holes like V4641 Sgr located
near the Sagittarius arm of the Milky Way. Some sciences however may not investigate natural
kinds at all. Some have alleged that evolutionary biology is such a science.
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distinguish between kind and token essentialism (LaPorte, 1997).9 The former
claims that kinds have essences and the latter claims particulars have essences.
For example, necessarily x is nitrogen if, and only if, x has atomic number 14.
However, this does mean that for some bit of nitrogen it cannot “transmute”
into some other element.
To start, if species are natural kinds, then they must have essential proper-
ties. If species have essential properties, then necessarily there is at least one
property which all and only the members of that species possess where that
property must explain why the members are the way they are. According to
Sober (1980), essentialism about species was largely supported by a commit-
ment to Aristotle’s natural state model. For any natural kind, there is a natural
state which instances of that kind tend to and they depart from that natural
state when interfering forces occur (e.g. in Newtonian physics an object re-
mains in motion unless affected by a force). Thus, “monsters” in biology are
the product of natural tendencies and interfering forces. However, are there
natural states in biology?
In the 19th century, we have the rise of statistics, which codifies the notion
of “normality” with the concepts of a mean and variance or standard devia-
tion. Eventually, errors are simply understood as variation. The crucial point
is that variation is not explained away but becomes explanatory itself. For a
range of genotypes and environments, we have a set of phenotypic values;
however, there are no normal genotypes and environments. Hence, there are
not normal phenotypes. This is what is called a norm of reaction. Population
thinking does not view traits as normal but rather studies the statistical prop-
erties of populations. Period. One might object that we find zero-force laws
in evolutionary theory. For example, consider the Hardy-Weinberg equation
which states that when there is no selection, mutation, migration, and popu-
lations are effectively infinite in size, gene frequencies p and q of alleles A and
a at a locus will be p2 + 2pq + q2. One might think that forces such as natu-
ral selection, mutation, migration, or random genetic drift are interferences.
However, there is no reason to suppose that the absence of such processes is
the natural state of a population. Likewise, there is no reason to think of these
forces as interferences.
9Some philosophers such as Richard Boyd deny that kinds and tokens are metaphysically
distinct. Some philosophers of biology such as David Hull have argued that species are individ-
uals (i.e. concrete particulars) and not natural kinds. However, Boyd denies that the category
INDIVIDUAL and NATURAL KIND are ontologically distinct. Hence, if right, he can trivially accept
the species as individuals thesis.
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From the rejection of the natural state model, we find arguments against
species essentialism from David Hull (Hull, 1986) and Philip Kitcher (Kitcher,
1999). According to David Hull, if Homo sapiens is a natural kind, then there
are intrinsic properties which necessarily all and only humans have. However,
there are no such properties since evolutionary processes can eliminate or
introduce any such intrinsic property. Therefore, Homo sapiens is not a natural
kind. Of course, even if there is no intrinsic property essential to a species it
does not follow there are no extrinsic properties essential to a species which is
in fact Hull’s own view. Specifically, a species position in the phylogenetic tree
could not be other than it is. This is analogous to the claim of Saul Kripke that
one has one’s parents essentially. However, it is hard to find a non-circular
argument for such a modal claim.10 As such, I will disregard it for now. Note
the argument here would apply to other biological species as well.
Philip Kitcher (Kitcher, 1999) criticizes Neo-Aristotelianism on different
grounds. Roughly, if Homo sapiens has at least one essential property it will
not be a property like rationality since we could evolve to have very minimal
cognitive powers. Likewise, non-humans could evolve much greater cogni-
tive powers. So, even if our species has an essence, it will not be what Neo-
Aristotelians celebrate.11
A response to the above pair of arguments comes from Richard Boyd (Boyd,
1988b, 1991, 1999).12 He claims that traditional Lockean empiricism assumes
that kinds are conventional, defined in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions (via intrinsic properties), unrestricted with regard to time and place,
described by exceptionless natural laws, and and membership occurs in virtue
of sharing properties. On his Cornell realist account, he contends kinds are
real and known a posteriori; however, he denies that they must be defined
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. According to Boyd, for any
kind, there is a family of co-occurring properties such that their co-occurrence
results in a sort of homeostasis. The homeostasis in the family occurs because
10Thomas Hurka raised the following objection to this response. If necessarily a species has
the phylogenetic position it does, then it follows that necessarily scientific creationism is false.
However, most of us regard scientific creationism as merely contingently false not necessarily
so. However, in our post-Kripke philosophical world, we have become accustomed to the idea
that certain truths known a posteriori are unexpectedly necessary.
11Notoriously, Kitcher (Kitcher, 1984) has argued that species are best construed as sets and
not concrete particulars or natural kinds. So, Hull’s and Kitcher’s respective critiques though
similar are importantly different.
12For a similar though different response, see the following discussions in Machery 2008;
Lewens 2012; Machery 2012; Ramsey 2012.
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(a) either properties in the family are causally related or (b) result from some
common mechanism. For a natural kind, there is a kind term k that is applied
to the family, the homeostatic property cluster. There is no analytic defini-
tion of k in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions since the homeostasis
is contingent and imperfect. The “essence” of a homeostatic property cluster
kind is contingent and known a posteriori. Given the imperfect homeostasis,
there will “extensional indeterminancy” with regard to k (i.e., there will be an
x such that it will be neither true nor false whether k applies to an x). The
upshot of Boyd’s position is this – we need not assume that natural kinds have
modally strong essences. Rather, essences might concern the clustering of in-
trinsic and extrinsic properties (however, see Ereshefsky (2010) for a contrary
view). If this is so, then the above arguments against species essentialism are
unsound since they assume a very strong form of essentialism.
Another interesting argument against species essentialism is this (Hull,
1978, 1976).
Similarly, if all gold atoms were to cease existing, the class of gold
atoms would temporarily have no members. Later when atoms
arose with the appropriate atomic number, gold would come into
existence again. However, once a species becomes extinct, it can-
not arise again. If a species of flying reptile were to evolve which
was identical in every respect to a species of extinct pterodactyl
save origin, it would have to be classed as a new species. (Hull,
1976, 184)
Hull assumes that species are historical entities which are spatiotemporally
continuous; they have no “temporal gaps” (Ereshefsky, 1992). That is, if a
species go extinct at t, it is impossible for it appear at t ′ (where t < t ′). But,
Boyd could simply suggest that if a species goes extinct then it is very improb-
able for it to exist at t ′. At the root of this disagreement is whether necessarily
if all the members of species cease to exist at t, nevertheless, instances of that
species can exist at t ′.13
13A more effective defense of species as historical, spatiotemporal entities, is this.
Since the inception of evolutionary theory, species taxa have been considered
evolutionary units, that is, groups of organisms capable of evolving. The evolu-
tion of such groups requires that the organisms of a species taxon be connected
by heredity relations. Heredity relations, whether they be genetic or not, require
that the generations of a taxon be historically connected, otherwise information
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So far, contrary to the work of David Hull (Hull, 1986) and Philip Kitcher
(Kitcher, 1999), we have not seen that there is a particularly strong argument
from evolutionary biology against species essentialism. Thus, there is not, so
far at least, an argument against the natural goodness approach. However,
things become more complicated when we turn to biological functions.
4 Natural Goodness and Functions
Philosophers have spilt much ink attempting to make sense of functional claims.
A particularly important account is (Wright, 1973, 1976). On Wright’s view,
The function of x is to z means (a) x is there because it zs, and
(b) z is a consequence of x ’s being there.
The usual example of his analysis is an old favorite: that the function of the
human heart is to circulate blood means the heart is there because it circulates
blood, and circulating blood is a consequence of human hearts being there.14
This account was rejected due to many criticisms; here is one due to Christo-
pher Boorse (Boorse, 1976). Suppose in a scientist’s lab there is a gas leak
rendering the scientist unconscious; it appears that this case satisfies both (a)
and (b) above. The function of the gas is to render the scientist unconscious
means the gas leak is there because it renders the scientist unconscious and
the scientist’s unconscious state is a consequence of the gas leak. Surely, the
gas leak has no function or at least not this function.
will not be transmitted. The upshot is that if species taxa, or any taxa, are to
evolve, they must form historically connected entities. (Ereshefsky, 1992, 688).
But, one might object that hereditary relations require correlations between properties of
parents and offspring not that they be spatiotemporally continuous. One way of achieving
such correlations is through material overlap and thus spatiotemporal continuity (Griesemer,
2000) but it does not seem necessary.
14It is important to note that Wright’s account is a conceptual analysis of what he takes
the meaning of functional claims to be (or at least some paradigm cases). Current accounts
do not necessarily claim to be offering a conceptual analysis. Thus, consider Donald David-
son’s “swampman” (Davidson, 1987) – suppose a molecule-for-molecule replica of a human
is created by lightning in a swamp. According to the selected effects historical account, this
swampman’s heart would have no function. However, if one is not giving a conceptual analy-
sis of the concept BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION, then it is not clear what force such recondite examples
have (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991).
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A common response to Wright’s etiological account is to articulate it in the
context of evolution by natural selection. Put very simply,
The function of a trait T is that for which T evolved by natural
selection in the recent past.
A trait evolves by natural selection if, and only if, the trait is heritable, entities
with the trait have greater reproductive success relative to alternatives due to
possessing it, and there is variation with respect to the trait. Thus, the human
heart has the function of circulating blood if, and only if, having a human heart
is heritable, having a human heart contributed to the reproductive success of
those who possessed it in the recent past by circulating blood relative to the
alternatives, and there was variation in the recent past with respect to humans
hearts concerning the circulation of blood. A more sophisticated account of
selected effect functions is due to Peter Godfrey-Smith.
The function of m is to F iff: (i) m is a member of family T , (ii)
members of family T are components of biologically real systems
of type S, (iii) among the properties copied between members of
T is property or property cluster C , (iv) one reason members of T
such as m exist now is the fact that past members of T were suc-
cessful under selection, through positively contributing to the fit-
ness of systems of type S, and (v) members of T were selected be-
cause they did F , through having C . (Godfrey-Smith, 1994, 350)
This selected effect account avoids Boorse’s counterexample since T is a token
of a “reproductive family”; i.e., T is a copy of other tokens of the same kind.
The gas leak is not a member of a reproductive family.
On the selected effects account of functions, if a trait has the function to
F , then it it supposed to F and if it does not, it is malfunctioning. As such, a
sort of normativity just is biological function. This is additionally crucial to the
natural goodness approach since ethical claims are supposed to be normative
and teleological by their nature. Unfortunately, the sorts of traits humans have
that are functional or adaptations may often be exactly the sort of trait that
we deem ethically impermissible. That is, evolution by natural selection may
have selected for F but nevertheless ethical considerations suggest we should
not do F . I want to consider such an example to make the point.
In their A Natural History of Rape, Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer of-
fer two hypotheses for the evolution of rape by males of our species. The
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first hypothesis is that rape is an adaptation and the second is that it is a
by-product of other adaptations. Their argument starts from claims regard-
ing sex differences. Since parental investment by women involves great costs
through pregnancy, nursing, and infant care, they have evolved to be excep-
tionally choosy with regard to their mates. On the other hand, the investment
by males is much less since they may impregnate a female without any re-
sources invested in parenting. Thus, from the point of view of selection, one
should maximize reproductive success by having as many (viable) offspring
as possible. For males, that means have lots of sex given that sperm is cheap.
For females, that means putting lots of resources into one’s offspring given
that eggs and the subsequent allocation of resources are very expensive. Now
consider males who have difficulty in achieving sexual access to females. If
there is heritable variation in fitness with regard to rape behavior on the part
of those males, then all things considered, such behaviors should be selected
for. As such, this behavior would be an adaptation and would have the func-
tion of increasing expected reproductive success. Of course, the by-product
hypothesis would suggest that rape behavior is not itself an adaptation though
it is a consequence of other adaptations. Thornhill and Palmer consider the
latter hypothesis, but accept the adaptation hypothesis as better supported.
We can formulate my objection to the natural goodness approach as fol-
lows. It is possible that males of Homo sapiens have an adaptation to rape
women when it is difficult to secure sexual relations with females. However,
if rape is an adaptation, then given the selected effects account of function,
this rape behavior has the function of increasing reproductive success of these
“unchoosen,” low status males. That is, this behavioral disposition has the
function to increase expected reproductive success. Males in those circum-
stances would be malfunctioning if they didn’t rape since that is what they are
supposed to do. Clearly however, this conflicts with our considered moral judg-
ments regarding sexual relationships between men and women. Simply put, it
is morally wrong to rape women. Moral theorists are in agreement that wide
reflective equilibrium requires that we find a stable equilibrium between our
considered moral judgments, normative theories, metaethical views, and the
sciences. My suggestion is that if evolutionary psychologists are correct, then
the Neo-Aristotelian who views ethical normativity as a species of biological
normativity would have to accept rape behavior as morally acceptable.
Now, as a matter of fact, I think evolutionary psychologists are wrong in
their speculations (see Lloyd 2001; Kitcher and Vickers 2003; Coyne 2000 for
critical discussions). First, Thornhill and Palmer are committed to a hyper-
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adaptationism, the claim that most traits are adaptations, which is implau-
sible. Second, they characterize rape as a specifically sexual act that occurs
with fertile female partners and that is sometimes true but certainly does not
make sense of the rape of children, same-sex individuals, and those past re-
productive age. Third, they provide next to no evidence that there is heritable
variation in fitness with regard to this trait, which is what is needed to argue
that it evolved by natural selection. Fourth, in the case of rape, the success
rate of insemination is extremely low (approximately 2%, see Lloyd (2001))
which suggests that it is a very ineffective strategy. All of this being said, I do
not think this removes the objection I have raised against the natural goodness
approach. The fact that it is possible that such behavior would be functional
and hence would be morally permissible should be worrisome enough.
One might respond to my objection in one of several ways. First, one
might argue that in a world in which this was selected for and hence had this
biological function, rape would not be regarded as morally impermissible since
things would be so very different than they are.15 Unfortunately, this response
does not work; evolutionary psychologists suggest as a matter of fact that this
behavior is an adaptation in the actual world. We are not talking about some
far flung possible world where our considered moral judgments have no force.
Contrary to the above skepticism, evolutionary psychologists could be right and
that is worrisome for a biologically grounded natural goodness approach.
A second response would be to note that Neo-Aristotelians think that char-
acter traits must be evaluated with respect to how they serve individual sur-
vival, species’ continuance, freedom from pain and enjoyment, and the func-
tioning of the social group. One might argue that a virtuous agent acting
in character would not rape because of the resulting anguish suffered by the
woman herself. However, this is but one of the goals mentioned and one might
insist that this sort of individual is “fitted” or “endowed” quite well to the other
three aspects of human flourishing. Hence, all things considered, rape behav-
ior is what a virtuous agent acting in character would rape if they are were a
“low status” male.
Another response would be to reject the selected effects account of func-
tions. In fact, this is precisely what Foot does as we saw earlier. One could
employ Robert Cummins’ (Cummins, 1975) systemic capacity account of func-
15Here I am thinking of R. M. Hare’s (Hare, 1979) response to the objection that utilitari-
anism would condone slavery. His response is twofold. First, if slavery were really harmful,
then utilitarianism would not condone it. Second, if it were not really harmful, then it might
condone it but so what?
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tions. Suppose that x is some part of a system S, has a disposition F , and S
itself has some disposition C . Roughly then, the systemic capacity function of
x in a system S is to F if, and only if, x is capable of F -ing and x ’s capacity
to F in part accounts for S’s capacity to C . The notion of flourishing needed
on the natural goodness approach presupposes a notion of proper function.
That is, if some x has a function F , then x ought to F ; there would thereby
be norms of performance. One can plausibly argue that the selected effects
account provides us with norms of performance since x has the function F in
virtue of past xs F -ing even when x as a matter of fact cannot F . For example,
a defective heart ought to circulate blood because past hearts were selected
to circulate blood. However, the systemic capacity account ascribes functions
even when no previous x F -ed. That is, we cannot ground norms of perfor-
mance in terms of past xs F -ing. Hence, on the systemic capacity account,
there are no proper functions; i.e. no natural norms. But if there are no natu-
ral norms on this view, then this account cannot supply the natural goodness
approach with what it needs.
Finally, and most obviously, one might claim that ethical normativity is not
a species of biological normativity. Though biological functions are one com-
ponent of human flourishing, they do not exhaust it. The form of evaluative
judgments in morality is the same as biological ones but that does not imply
that they are biological per se.16 It is this last strategy that I want to pursue in
the next section.
5 Natural Goodness and Gene-Culture Coevolu-
tion
Behaviorally modern humans (those with blades, beads, burials, bone tool-
making, and beauty) reached the Arctic circle approximately 30,000 years
ago. Suppose you are stranded on the coast of King William Island (68.935N,
98.89W) in November.17 Given that the monthly average temperature is be-
tween −25◦C and −35◦C, how do you stay warm? The Central Inuit used
16For two responses to worries regarding biological teleology and the natural goodness
approach, see (Gowans, 2008; Lott, 2012). However, both responses in defending the natural
goodness approach against similar worries as those raised in this section, push this approach
in the direction of non-naturalism. As such, they are not adequate defenses of a natural
goodness approach.
17The details of the following story come from (Henrich and McElreath, 2003).
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Caribou skins that were stretched and scraped into shape and had wolverine
collars. How do you build shelter? The Central Inuit built vaulted structures
3 meters high made of snow blocks cut with serrated bone knives with low
doors and skins draped along the outside achieving a temperature of 10◦C
−20◦C. How you make fire? You cannot use wood so you make stone lamps
with wicks made of moss which burns seal fat fuel. How do you get food? You
cover the conical chambers with snow and wait for hours for seals to move the
down trigger at which point you plunge your handmade antler harpoon with
a detachable head with sinew cord.
Could you make it? No. During 1845−1846, Sir John Franklin set out with
two ships to explore the north coast of North America; he was an experienced
Arctic traveler with an extensive library, a very select crew, and a three year
supply of food. They spent the winter of 1846 trapped at King William Island
stuck in the ice and after they ran out of food they left on foot and everyone
died from starvation and/or scurvy. The Polar Inuit of northwest Greenland
were hit by an epidemic which killed older, knowledgeable members of the
group resulting in the loss of kayaks, bows and arrows, and efficient snow
houses. They could not hunt caribou, and could only hunt seals and char
part-time. As a result their population dwindled until they encountered an
immigrating group of Polar Inuit from Baffin Island.
The crucial insight of these stories is that we do not only inherit genes
but we also inherit culture. Moreover, cultural forms which are inherited can
be selected for just as genes and phenotypic traits are. As dual inheritance
theorists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson write,
Culture is information capable of affecting individual’s behavior
that they acquire from other members of their species through
teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission. (Boyd
et al., 2003, 5).
Put very simply, dual inheritance theory, otherwise known as gene-culture co-
evolution theory, argues that sometimes behavioral changes occur too quickly
to explained by genes and behavioral traditions vary even in environmentally
homogeneous environments. Genes and environment undoubtedly account
for some variation in human behavior but the socially transmitted component
of culture cannot be ignored (Boyd, 1988a).
Social transmission can occur in several different ways (for a nice discus-
sion of the basic concepts of gene-culture coevolutionary theory, see (Laland
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and Brown, 2011, chap.7)). First, it can occur vertically from parents to off-
spring. Second, it can occur obliquely from parental to offspring generation;
e.g. from teachers or religious elders. Third, it can occur horizontally from
within-generation peers, e.g. as learning from friends or siblings. Selection
for cultural traits is a form of bias. That is, the expected reproductive success
of cultural variants differ. There are several forms of such bias. According to
biased cultural transmission, given a choice between two alternative behaviors,
individuals may be more likely to adopt one rather than the other. Direct bias
occurs when individuals choose which of two alternative behaviors to adopt.
Frequency-dependent bias occurs when the commonness or rarity of a behavior
affects the probability of information transmission (which can generate confor-
mity). Indirect bias occurs when cues are used to determine which individuals
to observe in order to acquire information about trait.
The most common empirical example of gene-culture coevolution given is
the lactose intolerance in humans. Adult humans vary considerably in their
ability to digest milk because of variation in the enzyme lactase which breaks
down energy-rich sugar lactose in dairy products. Absorbers reach 90% in
dairy farming regions but typically less than 20% in non-dairy farming re-
gions. Why? Because a culture of dairy farming created a selective regime for
the allele for absorption. Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (Feldman and Cavalli-
Sforza, 1986) devised a model combing single-locus genetics for lactose ab-
sorption and two culturally influenced behavior traits (milk users, non-users)
and showed If Pr(child milk usage | parent milk usage) is high, then there is
strong selection for the allele for lactose tolerance to reach high frequencies
within 300 generations. If Pr(child milk usage | parent milk usage) is low,
then unrealistically strong selection is required for the allele for lactose tol-
erance to reach high frequencies in 300 generations. Hence, the only way to
explain the prevalence of certain biological traits is through cultural selection
and inheritance.
One of the puzzling findings in the social sciences is what is called “altruis-
tic punishment.” An example of this is the ultimatum game. In this game, two
players interact to decide how to divide a sum of money. The first player pro-
poses that they receive a fraction x and then the second player receives (1−x).
However, the second player can either accept or reject the offer but if they re-
ject the offer, no one receives any money. Experimentally, psychologists have
shown that when the second player perceives the proportions x and (1− x) to
be unfair, the second player will routinely punish the first player by ensuring
they receive nothing. However, many think this is irrational since so long as
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(1− x)> 0, then it is in the second player’s self-interest to accept the proposal
given it in one’s self-interest to receive some sum of money rather than none.
Traditional evolutionary explanations for such altruistic behavior such as kin
selection and reciprocal altruism seem incapable of explaining such one-shot
games and their results. Gene-culture coevolution models have been offered
to explain altruistic punishment and its prevalence.
Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, and Peter Richerson (Boyd
et al., 2003) have offered one such cultural group selection model. Let me
sketch their results. Suppose we have a large population with groups of size n.
Suppose there are three behavioral types contributors, defectors, and punishers.
The contributor, of which there is a fraction x , cooperates receiving a benefit
b at a cost c and so their expected payoff is bx − c. The defector does not
cooperate and hence receives the benefit but suffers no cost. Their expected
payoff is bx . Since c > 0, then defectors should replace contributors. However,
suppose punishers cooperate and punish the defectors reducing their payoff by
p/n at a cost to themselves of k/n. Letting the frequency of punishers be y , the
expected payoffs to contributors is b(x + y)− c, to defectors is b(x + y)− p y ,
and to punishers is b(x+ y)−c−k(1− x− y). When p y > c, then contributors
will replace defectors. However, punishers have a lower expected payoff than
contributors (though as the frequency of defectors (1− x− y) decreases, then
selection against punishers becomes ever weakened). So, how can altruistic
punishment evolve culturally if the punisher is less fit than contributor?
Bowles, Boyd, Gentis, and Richardson modeled cultural group selection of
altruistic punishment as follows. Suppose we have a N groups which main-
tain a constant size n due to density-dependent intragroup competition. The
individuals of these groups interact in two stages. in the first stage, the con-
tributors and punishers cooperate with a probability of (1− e) and defect with
a probability e. Defectors always defect. Cooperation reduces the expected
payoff of contributors and punishers by c but also increases a group’s ability
to compete with other groups. In the second stage, the punishers punish those
who defected in the first round. After this second stage, individuals randomly
pair with a probability of (1 − m) with someone of their own group and m
with someone of a different group. If individual i interacts with j, i imitates
j’s behavior with a probability of Wj/(Wj + Wl) in which Wx is the payoff to
individual x in the game. This ensures that higher payoff behaviors spread
within and across groups.18 Lastly, cultural group selection occurs through in-
18Also this provides heritability to these behaviors. Genes are not required for heritability
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tergroup conflict in which a group drives the other to social extinction. The
probability that group i defeats group j is 1/2[1 + (d j − di)] in which dq is
the proportion of defectors in group q. Thus, as cooperation and punishment
increase, defectors decrease increasing the probability that altruistic groups
outcompete selfish groups.
Bowles, Boyd, Gentis, and Richardson ran computer simulations which
show how the evolution of cooperation is strongly affected by the presence
of altruistic punishment. There are 128 groups one with only altruistic pun-
ishers and the other 127 were only composed only of defectors. The simula-
tions were run for 2,000 time periods. The parameter values were chosen to
model cultural evolution in small scale societies or tribes based on background
knowledge.19
boydricherson.jpeg
Figure 1: The evolution of cooperation is strongly affected by the presence of
punishment (Boyd et al., 2003, 3532)
between individuals since any mechanism which creates correlations between traits of “par-
ents” and “offspring” will do the trick. Culture can do this as can genes.
19For example, they assume that the cost to the punishee is four times as costly to them
rather than the punisher (i.e. p = 0.8). Likewise, they assume that migration rates mirror
that found in small societies (m = 0.01). They also assume that the mean group extinction
rate is roughly that found in such societies (i.e. 0.0075)(Boyd et al., 2003, 3532).
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In figure (a), we have the long-run average frequency of cooperation as a
function of group size if there is no punishment (p = k = 0) for three different
conflict rates, 0.075, 0.015, and 0.003. It turns out that group selection is
ineffective when groups are small. However, in figure (b), when punishment
(p = 0.8, k = 0.2) is incorporated, cultural group selection can keep coopera-
tion prevalent in larger groups.
As an empirical example of cultural group selection (though not necessar-
ily through altruistic punishment), consider the Nuer and Dinka who lived in
the marshes of southern Sudan (see Kelly 1985, Richerson and Boyd 2008, 23-
25). Both Nuer and Dinka used the same habitat with the same technologies;
however, they differ in important ways. First, during the dry season, the Nuer
maintained larger herds of cattle than the Dinka and never slaughtered them
for food as did the Dinka. Rather, they consumed almost only grains and milk.
Second, the Nuer tribes were structured patrilinearlly and the Dinka tribes
were arranged around those who lived together in encampment. Third, the
two differed over their bride-price customs. The Nuer required a minimum
of 22 cows and would not take credit and the Dinka had no minimum and
did take credit. The upshot of these practices is that the Nuer outnumbered
the Dinka in raids often 2:1. Between 1820− 1860, the Nuer expanded their
territory conquering the Dinka by either killing them or assimilating the Dinka
into Nuer tribes. Cultural evolution by cultural group selection requires varia-
tion amongst groups in their cultural feature, those features contribute to the
persistence or proliferation of groups, and those cultural features are passed
on generation to generation. One can argue that each of these conditions was
satisfied in the intergroup conflict between the Nuer and Dinka.
Gene-culture coevolutionary theory thus provides an important “how pos-
sibly” explanation for the cultural evolution of an otherwise puzzling phe-
nomenon: altruistic punishment. Philosophically, there are two important
implications of this work for the natural goodness approach. First, cultural
evolution by cultural group selection occurs when there is heritable variation
in cultural group fitness. Thus, when some cultural group trait evolves in this
way it comes to have a “cultural function.” The selected effects account of
functions thus can be applied to cultural traits; we can merely revise Godfrey-
Smith’s selected effects account to include “real cultural systems”, cultural in-
heritance, and transmission biases. Moreover, we can talk sensibly about what
certain cultural traits, behaviors, or norms are for. These traits have evolved
for certain effects which explain their presence and insofar as a group does
not exhibit such traits we can say that they are malfunctioning – they are not
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doing what they are supposed to. Second, we have the very same problem that
we found in the conflict between our considered moral judgments and the im-
plications of evolutionary biology. The exception here is that we have removed
any overtones of reductionism to biology. Consider the cultural evolution of al-
truistic punishment. If Bowles, Boyd, Gentis, and Richardson are correct, then
it evolved to facilitate the driving of less cooperative groups to extinction. That
is what it is for and insofar as it does not do this the group is malfunctioning.
Altruistic punishment evolved to encourage the “good functioning of its social
group” precisely by eliminating other social groups or tribes. Insofar as altru-
istic punishment, tribal instincts, and imitative bias were culturally selected
for intergroup conflict, the Nuer tribes should have driven the Dinka socially
extinct. Moreover, if they had opted not to, then then those tribes would
be malfunctioning. They would be as malfunctional as a free-riding wolf, a
non-sharing bee, or a nurturing polar bear. But surely this is not a trait that
we believe should be promoted. Xenophobia leading to violence or cultural
extinction is not a praiseworthy trait of a group.
Thus, we have the following dilemma. If there are natural norms that ap-
ply to our species, then those norms derive from selected effects functions.
However, selected effects function derive from either evolution by natural se-
lection or cultural evolution by cultural selection. These selection processes
may shape traits that have functions which should be resisted not promoted.
For the natural goodness approach to make sense, it must endorse these traits
contrary to what our considered ethical judgments suggest. As such, the natu-
ral goodness approach either leads to moral problematic judgments or cannot
make good on the notion of teleology operating in the theory.
6 Methodological Reflections and Revisionism
By way of summary, we have seen one solution to the problem of normativ-
ity in a wholly natural world is to understand norms as natural.20 They are
selected effect functions due to either evolutionary biological or cultural evo-
lution and selection. However, what these selected effect functions are for is
contrary to our considered ethical judgments. Hence, we could accept our
considered moral judgments and reject the claim that selected effect functions
ground ethical normativity. Or, one can always reject the considered moral
20I am particularly indebted to William Rottschaefer and Nicholas D. Smith for discussion
of the points in this section.
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judgments of the day in favor of a particular metaethical or scientific view.
Let’s say that a moral theory (metaethical or normative) is revisionist insofar
as it rejects considered moral judgments. A theory then can be more or less
revisionistic and it might reject more important considered judgments than
others (if we weight some judgments greater than others). One might resist
the claim that rape behavior or aggressive intergroup conflict are morally bad.
For example, one might argue that in very exceptional circumstances (i.e. af-
ter some apocalypse), our considered moral judgments would be very different
regarding forcible sex of a woman. Likewise, one might argue that altruistic
punishment should lead to the social extinction of other groups (e.g. consider
a group that engages in female genital mutilation). Now, I have registered my
dissatisfaction with both of these responses. First, evolutionary psychologists
claim that rape is in the actual world an adaptation. Hence, supposing our
considered moral judgments would be different in an apocalypse is irrelevant
to the present case. Second, our considered moral judgments regarding social
extinction and female genital mutilation surely would be that this social norm
should be driven extinct, but the cultural group selection model applies to any
norms which involve altruistic punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992). For
example, Boyd and Richerson write,
Moralistic punishment is the strategy of punishing others who dis-
obey a moral rule and also sanctioning those who do not pun-
ish others for breaking the rule. In principle, moralistic punish-
ment strategies could create cooperation in large groups. How-
ever, this mechanism will stabilize any norm that becomes com-
mon, whether adaptive or not (wearing ties to work is a humble
example of the latter). (Richerson and Boyd, 2001, 195)
Surely, if Boyd and Richerson are right that even norms like, “wear a tie to
work,” have the function of social extinction through altruistic punishment
we should not drive other groups social extinct insofar as they disregard such
trivial norms.
As an another example of revisionism, many utilitarians recognize that
their theory makes extremely demanding claims on moral agents. If one must
choose the action of those available that maximizes expected utility, one can
argue that there will be little in the way of an enjoyable life.21 However, those
21Of course, one can accept or deny that utilitarianism is an excessively demanding theory
(Kagan, 1991; Mulgan, 2001). My point is meant to be illustrative.
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utilitarians simply deny that we should expect an enjoyable life – morality is
extremely demanding (Singer, 1972)! One should not buy that latte, beer,
or go see that movie since one could do far more good with that small sum
of money. But this sort of denial of considered moral judgments is a limited
strategy since we will need some such judgments to even motivate acceptance
of a normative or metaeethical theory. Wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels,
1979) occurs between our considered moral judgments, normative principles,
metaethics, and the natural and social sciences. However, without our con-
sidered moral judgments (maybe even with) we will have more than one
coherent set of normative principles, metaethics, and the natural and social
sciences.
In addition, we must find relevant difference-makers as to why some con-
sidered judgments are accepted and others rejected. Otherwise, if we reject
one judgment and not another such revisions will be ad hoc. Consider an
example from the history of science, the case of Uranus’ orbit. In the nine-
teenth century, Newtonian mechanics had successfully accounted for the or-
bits of most of the known planets. However, there was one particularly difficult
case, Uranus. Newtonian mechanics incorrectly predicted Uranus’ orbit. As-
tronomers concluded that either Newtonian mechanics was incorrect or they
had made some calculational mistake. John Adams and Urbain Leverrier pro-
posed that there was an unobserved planet of a certain size and distance be-
yond Uranus and they subsequently predicted its orbit. They found that the
orbit of Uranus was as Newtonian mechanics predicts when conjoined with
the additional auxiliary hypothesis. Eventually the unobserved planet, Nep-
tune, was observed and Newtonian mechanics was recognized as successful.
The auxiliary hypothesis, “There is a planet of a certain size and at a certain
location which gives rise to certain perturbations in Uranus’ orbit,” was not
ad hoc since one could test it independently of Newton’s law of gravitation
and laws of motion. Eventually, one could see Neptune with a telescope. We
need some notion of “independent testing” in our moral theorizing as well. In
the case of utilitarianism, it is clear that philosophers like Peter Singer accept
considered moral judgments when they support their theory (e.g. you should
save a drowning child when it merely ruins your shoes) but not when they
challenge it (e.g. you should not have a latte, a beer with friends, or see a
movie at the theater). Thus, I am skeptical that a radical revisionism is the
right tact to take with regard to metaethics and normative moral theory. And
specifically, I am suspicious of proponents of the natural goodness approach
shirking our considered moral judgments in favor of their metaethics.
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It is important to make one last point regarding Neo-Aristotelianism. Noth-
ing I have said speaks against their most central ideas of (a) human needs are
structured such that there is such a thing as human flourishing, (b) inculcating
virtues, classical or otherwise, is the most effective means to advance human
flourishing, and (c) and morality is fundamentally about human flourishing.
Rather, Neo-Aristotelians should not expect to ground their naturalistic ac-
count of normativity in the selected effects functional approach but in some
other (e.g. Humean) approach.22
7 Conclusion
In this essay, I have scrutinized the natural goodness approach in the light
of evolutionary biology. After presenting the approach, I argued that certain
challenges regarding its commitment to species essentialism fail. Likewise,
I argued that given our best account of natural norms, the selected effects
account of function, leads to implausible ethical conclusions. This is so on a
evolutionary biological or gene-culture coevolutionary account. In the end,
the natural goodness appears to be neither natural nor good.
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